tion because they share, despite differences in levels of economic development, a number of characteristics, which are likely to be reflected in their reaction to American influences. First of all they were relatively late in developing managerial capitalism along the lines of the United States, that is, large-scale enterprises, managed by salaried, professional managers rather than their owners (Chandler, Amatori, & Hikino, 1997) . For most of the 20th century up until today, in these countries family-owned and -managed businesses account for an important share among the largest enterprises (Bugra, 1994; Cassis, 1997; Guillén, 2000) . This means that there might have been less of a need for professionally trained managers following the U.S. model. At the same time, to the degree that such a need arose, American models might have found it easier to establish themselves because of the absence or limited development of indigenous alternatives (cf. for parallels in the case of consulting, Kipping, 1996) . Second, these countries are characterized by a significant state influence in the higher education system, unlike Northern Europe, where universities benefited from a higher degree of academic freedom and self-governance (Clark, 1983) . This means that one might expect a higher degree of uniformity in the outcome of the American influences-be it in terms of adoption or in terms of rejection.
This study focused on organizational formations and program offerings and thus on the construction of and changes in the institutional field of academic management education in each country as a setting with claims toward the production of managerial elites. The main purpose of the article is to suggest that emulating American patterns of management education throughout the last half of the 20th century has not led to local replicas but hybrid forms and institutional fields that have varied across the four countries. The central rationale behind this argument is that despite widespread tendencies in the post-World War II environment, and indeed, again in the past decade or so, toward importing from the United States, preexisting institutional frameworks of higher education in each country have generated tensions in the accommodation of American transplants, leading to adaptations and divergent paths of development. Importing, as in this case, educational models involves attempts toward creating new institutions and altering extant institutional arrangements. Pre-existing arrangements are likely to be resilient, the strength of which will depend on their degree of institutionalization and interconnectedness with institutional frameworks in related realms. As more recent reorientations in neoinstitutionalist thinking would suggest (e.g., Scott, 2001) , institutional creation and change involves borrowing from, reconciling with, and capitalizing on extant frames. The latter thus serve as not only constraints on international reproduction but also opportunities for novel adaptations (Üsdiken, Kieser, & Kjaer, 2004) . Tension and struggle is inevitable, though likely to be variant across settings, and outcomes dependent not only on the strategizing of the activists but also on the strength of the support that they can muster through links with and the involvement of other interested parties.
Guided by these ideas, the article first provides a brief comparative-historical account of pre-World War II developments in management, or rather business, education in the four countries. The main part of the article then takes up the initiatives in each country for transplanting U.S.-based models and the outcomes that were obtained in the way of accommodation into or alterations within the higher education field. It looks at three periods, the late 1940s and 1950s, in the aftermath of World War II, when direct U.S. influence was the strongest; the late 1960s and 1970s, when Europeans looked toward the United States in search of a response to the "American challenge" (Servan-Schreiber, 1967) ; and the last decade of the 20th century, when American models again became dominant. The article closes with a discussion attempting to draw out the major implications of the comparative examination.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Among the four countries studied, France was historically the only one to develop its own model of business education. The key elements of French higher education at large were a division between the universities and the so-called grandes écoles-a division that has marked the French educational system and the country's elite reproduction for almost 2 centuries (Bourdieu, 1998) . The former typically was made up of the faculties of law, letters and sciences, medicine, and theology or pharmacy (Clark, 1983) . It was the grandes écoles, however, that provided much of the country's elite since the 19th century, first in the public and then increasingly in the private sector. The most important ones were established as engineering schools during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic years, their curricula very much biased toward mathematics (Kipping & Nioche, 1998) . They were, similar to the universities, owned and governed by the state, though not by the Ministry of Education but by the relevant ministries, including Industry, Defense, and Finance. The commercial schools, on the other hand, developed, toward the end of the 19th century as a less prestigious companion to prominent engineering grandes écoles-a stigma that has marked them until the present day. They were outside the state system, often established and run by chambers of commerce and industry (Takagi & de Carlo, 2003) . Trained in law, accounting, commercial subjects, and languages rather than mathematics, their graduates would usually aspire to middle management or sales positions typically in commerce and banking (Gouadain & Louart, 1997; Kipping & Nioche, 1998) .
The commercial schools in Italy were originally similar in form and the content of education to the écoles de commerce in France, not least because they also emerged independently from universities. The first Scuola Superiore di Commercio was established in Venice, patterned after the pioneering school in Antwerp, to later serve as a model for the others that followed (Longobardi, 1927) . Bookkeeping and commercial practice constituted the core of studies, though the significance of law and economics expanded over time (Longobardi, 1927) . A notable feature of the early development of these schools was the involvement, in addition to chambers of commerce, of central and local government, leading Longobardi (1927) to indicate that they were essentially "state schools." Private ones also existed, however, among them the Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi established in Milan in 1902. Within a higher education field where economics was becoming a separate university discipline (Longobardi, 1927) , the Italian state schools of commerce, very much similar to their German counterparts, increasingly became academicized, developing their own version of the betriebswirtschaftslehre (BWL; the German "science of business economics") and were, by mid-1930s, incorporated into the university system in the country (Fauri, 1998) .
French influence extended to early developments in Spain, as well as in Turkey. Spain copied the model of the engineering schools and their elite corps as well as the schools of commerce (Fernández Aguado, 1997) . Engineering schools were thus, similar to the ones in France, intensive in mathematics and strongly elitist. The ones in Madrid and Barcelona were the most influential, serving as the major sources of managerial talent, respectively, for the public and private sectors. Commercial schools were established around the mid-19th century, patterned after the early French exemplars in secondary education (see Locke, 1984) , some of them later beginning to offer higher level degrees. Unlike France, however, they were public schools and were governed by the Ministry of Education. The exceptional private one also existed as in the case of the Universidad Comercial de Deusto founded in Bilbao in 1916 by the Society of Jesus, modeled after Bocconi in Milan (Colinas Aguirrebengoa, 1966; Mosson, 1965) . Early institutional evolution, on the other hand, was largely akin to France as university involvement in education for business had to wait until almost mid-20th century when the University of Madrid established in 1944 the first faculty in the country for economics and political science.
In Turkey, too, the Parisian Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) founded in 1881 served as the model for the first "higher" school of commerce founded in Istanbul 2 years later, which, unlike the one in Paris, however, was a state initiative. This was one of the various projects in the Ottoman Empire at the time toward creating alternative Westernized systems of higher education for which the French university and écoles were the major sources of inspiration (Tekeli & Ilkin, 1993) . When the Turkish Republic was founded in 1923 in lieu of the Empire it inherited this embryonic dual structure under state control. The commercial school survived as a separate strand (joined in 1944 by another one in Izmir) despite the opening in 1936 of a Faculty of Economics in the University of Istanbul. Different from France, however, the university and its faculties not only enjoyed greater status but also were imbued by a strong dose of German influence because of the advent of a large number of professors fleeing Nazi rule, including the penetration of the German BWL into Turkish business education (Üsdiken et al., 2004) .
So before the post-World War II American encounter, all four countries had developed institutions and experience in business education, borrowing extensively from France and to a certain extent among each other as well as, with the exception of France, from Germany. In all of them, the origins rested in similar undertakings in the form of commercial schools outside universities, and over time business education retained its primarily pre-experience character. By mid-century, however, some degree of divergence had already set in, notably in terms of governance and with regard to integration and stratification within the higher education field. In France and Spain, commercial education remained outside the university system but under different forms of governance-private in the former, predominantly state in the latter. In both cases they were second-tier vis-à-vis schools of engineering, though with some degree of reception among entrepreneurial families and as an educational opportunity for middle management (Colinas Aguirrebengoa, 1966; Meuleau, 1981) . By contrast in Turkey, a dual structure emerged comprising commercial schools and universities, however, with both strands under state control and the commercial schools becoming secondary in a field dominated, especially after the mid-1930s, by the university with a direct claim toward educating economists and administrators for senior posts. In Italy, on the other hand, the commercial schools had become incorporated into universities at about the same time, though different from Turkey, a few private ones survived as independent operations. Notably all four countries remained largely immune to American influence, with the exception of some ad hoc postexperience education initiatives during interwar years in France (Kipping & Nioche, 1998; Gemelli, 1998b) and in Italy (Fauri, 1998) inspired by the Harvard Business School (HBS).
THE POST-WORLD WAR II AMERICAN ENCOUNTER
The situation changed after 1945, as all these countries reacted to the educational models for business and management flowing from the United States. As in other parts of Europe, in these countries, too, parts of polity, society, and business conceived American management education as a means to alleviate the ills of industry at the time, such as low productivity, conservatism of management, and nonqualified managers. Learning from the United States and importing its ways of educating managers was regarded as a "weapon of social change" (Leavitt, 1957, p. 155) . This involved conscious attempts by the state bureaucracy or certain societal and business groups, such as religious networks in the Spanish case (Puig, 2003) or leading entrepreneurs in the Italian one (Gemelli, 1998a) , to contribute to the modernization of business practices, sometimes within rather restrictive political frameworks. Beyond the free enterprise ideology that colored the concurrent American productivity drive (Kipping & Nioche, 1998) , there were strategic considerations too because of communist influence in France and Italy and military concerns in Spain and Turkey.
The flow of aid for developing management education was part of strengthening security ties. The postwar American drive involved funding arrangements through the Marshall Plan agency and its later versions as well as the Ford Foundation that enabled U.S. universities to provide counsel and active participation for the transfer of educational forms and curricula as well as teaching material and methods (Adams & Garraty, 1960; Locke, 1996; McGlade, 1998) . Although the drive was strong, it was not monolithic and necessarily coherent, involving a variety of channels and models (Gourvish & Tiratsoo, 1998) . With respect to formal education, what Americans advised to Europe in general was introducing management studies into engineering schools, establishing undergraduate programs in business and graduate business schools such as the ones in the United States (Kipping & Nioche, 1998) .
Early postwar initiatives in France focused on further training of businesspeople and managers (Boltanski, 1982) . They remained limited because of disagreements between the various actors, including the state, business associations, and existing educational institutions (Kipping & Nioche, 1998) . The American influence was more notable in the universities, which seized this opportunity to gain a foothold in pre-experience management education establishing graduate institutes of business administration (the IAE-Institut d'Administration des Enterprises) attached to faculties of law in universities (Adams & Garraty, 1960; Kipping & Nioche, 1998; Takagi & de Carlo, 2003) . Supported by the Ministry of Education, the productivity center and the business community, these institutes, numbering 15 by 1957, offered 1-year certificate programs (Kipping & Nioche, 1998 (Gemelli, 1996; Mosson, 1965) . Nevertheless, during the first postwar decade, the American influence remained limited at all levels. The IAEs did not develop into graduate schools of business, remaining rather marginal within university structures (Adams & Garraty, 1960) . Regarding content, the engineering grandes écoles resisted the inclusion of courses in business or management (Boltanski, 1982) . Changes in commercial school curricula were limited to a few pioneers, HEC, as one of the most prominent, for example, responding by making some curricular changes in the 1950s (Kipping & Nioche, 1998; Meuleau, 1981) .
Italy housed in Turin literally the first institution for postexperience management training in Europe after the war: Istituto Postuniversitario per lo Studio dell'Organizzazione Aziendale (IPSOA), which was established in 1952 to bring in American conceptions and methods for management education (Gemelli, 1996) . It was initiated by two leading industrialists and benefited from the sponsorship of the Ford Foundation and the HBS. Other initiatives followed in the 1950s and the 1960s predominantly in the form of private institutions outside the university system enjoying support from similar sources as well as the national productivity center (Gemelli 1998a (Gemelli , 1998c . These institutes were instrumental in bringing in American content and methods of instruction such as cases, business games, and role-playing (Malavolti, 1997) . Altogether, however, they remained alien to the universities and the industry and were, thus, not able to generate an influential pattern for management education. As Malavolti (1997) observed, these institutes were scarcely legitimized and tended to lose their innovative capacities and to decline unless they were included in university circuits. Indeed, IPSOA and some of the other pioneering institutions such as Istituto Superiore per Imprenditori e Dirigenti d'Azienda (ISIDA) and Scuola di Amministrazione Industriale (SAI) had to discontinue their activities in the 1960s and the 1970s (Gemelli, 1996; Malavolti, 1997; Rozzarin, 1997) .
The early aftermath of the Spanish encounter with U.S. postwar assistance resembled that of the Italian experience though, in part, with more direct state involvement. The first American-style school was the Escuela de Organización Industrial (EOI), for which IPSOA was also an important model (Puig, 2003) . EOI was created in 1955 by the ministries of education and industry and with support from the American technical aid program. It was rather the private Catholic schools that emerged in the late 1950s in Madrid and Barcelona that took to heart the American model and the advice, although they benefited less directly from the technical assistance programs (Puig & Fernández, 2003) . The Society of Jesus was involved in the foundation of two institutions, the Madrid-based Instituto Católico de Administración y Dirección de Empresas (ICADE), which was generously supported by the Jesuits and a number of Spanish corporations, two of them operating under American licenses (Puig, 2003) ; and the Escuela Superior de Administración de Empresas (ESADE), founded in Barcelona in 1958 by a group of Catalan Catholic entrepreneurs (Puig, 2003) . The Catholic institute closest to the American business school was Instituto Superior de Estudios de la Empresa (IESE), the "Harvard in Barcelona" for the Ford Foundation consultants (Frederick & Haberstroh, 1969; Mosson, 1965) . IESE was established by the conservative Catholic organization Opus Dei in 1958 as a branch of its Universidad de Navarra, a new American-style university (Puig, 2003) . With HBS as its model and mentor, the IESE initially developed its advanced management program for owners and managers of small and medium-size business, to be accompanied later by the launching of a full-time MBA, which not only became its flagship but also helped the consolidation of its faculty and research activity (Puig, 2003) .
Turkey's Is 7 letme Iktisadi Enstitüsü (IIE) in Istanbul, founded in 1954, was the second in line, after IPSOA, among the postwar institutes or schools for business established in Europe (Adams & Garraty, 1960; Gemelli, 1998b) . Somewhat similar to the IAE in France, but as the sole such initiative, it was created as an institute affiliated to the University of Istanbul's Faculty of Economics and availed of the support financially of the Ford Foundation and academically the HBS (Üsdiken, 1996) . Again similar to the IAE, its major offering was a 1-year program for university graduates relying heavily on the case method but leading not to a degree but to a certificate. Unlike any other unit in the university, it also had a general assembly where a number of firms were represented, though their lukewarm support was further diminished as they became disillusioned with the institute (Gemelli, 1998b) . Of equal, perhaps even greater, longer term significance was the establishment in the late 1950s in Ankara, again by the state, of an Americanstyle university (Middle East Technical University [METU]) with instruction in English, which offered the first-ever undergraduate degree in business administration (Üsdiken, 2003) . It was joined by the American Robert College, to be the only private (and foreign) institution allowed at the time to offer tuitionbased higher education (Freely, 2000) .
RESPONDING TO THE AMERICAN CHALLENGE
The 1960s saw a number of significant changes in the European business world, marked hitherto by less aggressive business practices and significant degrees of cartelization. The gradual opening of European markets following the Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, and the expansion of U.S. multinationals brought much more intense competition. These changes also affected countries, which remained outside the European Economic Community, such as Spain and Turkey. In all countries, imitation was part of the business response to the American challenge (ServanSchreiber, 1967), with companies often seeking recourse to U.S. consulting firms (Kipping, 1999) . In management education, American efforts to promote their models became less active than in the previous decades. However, at the same time, Europeans started looking more closely at the United States for inspiration.
In the 1960s, the leading commercial schools in France introduced curricular changes and also shifted increasingly to permanent faculty (Takagi & de Carlo, 2003) , thus beginning to gain a stature comparable to those in engineering and to generate a following in other schools of commerce (Boltanski, 1982; Languille, 1997) . They were to be joined by the formation of undergraduate programs in some of the universities and notably the founding in 1968 of a university (Dauphine) largely devoted to business and management studies. Most critical perhaps was the establishment, again in 1968, of the Fondation Nationale pour l'Enseignement de la Gestion des Entreprises (FNEGE) with the sponsorship of the chambers of commerce, employers' associations, and the ministries of education and industry-an accomplishment important in itself, because these sponsors often pursued different, sometimes conflicting, aims. Even more important, the FNEGE helped to generate a second wave of missionaries by funding doctoral studies in the United States for a large number of students who were then to form the core of the management faculty in France (Chessel & Pavis, 2001; Kipping & Nioche, 1998; Languille, 1997) . This has had a significant long-term effect-observable, for example, in the orientation toward the United States in terms of research and publications (Engwall, 1998) .
Similarly, in Italy it was from the mid-1960s onward that American content penetrated into universities in the form of limited inroads into curricular structures (Gemelli, 1998c) . Changes in this direction were strengthened only after reforms in faculties of engineering and of economics in the 1970s, which enabled the creation of new undergraduate programs in commerce and business, though still as a hybrid of the German BWL inspired economia aziendale tradition predating World War II and American-based content (Gemelli, 1998a) . A new initiative reviving the legacy of IPSOA was the founding of Istituto Studi Direzionali (ISTUD) in 1968 to offer MBA and executive education programs, sponsored by 10 companies and with a strong American orientation in content and teaching methods (Nahum, 1997) . Most notable among the post-1960s changes was the reorientation in Bocconi, the old private commercial school, after resistance for more than two decades, toward American content and methods of instruction (Gemelli, 1998a) . It involved the creation, in 1971, of the Scuola di Direzione Aziandale (SDA) within the university with a more generalist and international approach to graduate management education again based on the HBS model (Draebye & Pennarola, 1997) . The first MBA program began in 1975, its success leading to the launch of a large number of new programs and increasingly an international orientation (Draebye & Pennarola, 1997) .
The period from the early 1960s and through the 1970s in Spain was a time of market clarification and a search for identity (and clientele) for the various new schools (Puig & Fernández, 2003) . Graduate education was conceived as strongly American in the Spanish landscape, an idea promoted by these schools, though with the passage of time a certain degree of specialization among them increasingly became consolidated. The institutes run by the Jesuits (ICADE, ESADE, and Deusto) largely concentrated in undergraduate studies because of their close links with the network of secondary schools operated by the Society of Jesus and the local business communities that employed their graduates. IESE, EOI and the newer schools, most notably the Instituto de Empresa (IE) founded in 1975, on the other hand, specialized in graduate and postexperience education. The extraordinary significance of Opus Dei at the governmental level partially explains IESE's rise at the time, whereas EOI, in contrast, continued to receive poor state support. A companion notable development involved legislative changes in the 1960s, which put the old commercial schools in a somewhat inferior status within the higher education system. Decline in prestige and student numbers ensued until 1970 when they were integrated into the new university faculties of economics and business administration, though they still remained as somewhat second-class institutions offering 3-year degrees as opposed to 5 years of study in the faculties. The same date also marks the introduction of business administration into faculties of economics, generating some strain with the tradition rooted in the German BWL and, therefore, leading to a relatively low profile for some time to come for business studies within the public university system.
In Turkey, on the other hand, the expansion of undergraduate study based on the American model was accentuated when the IIE parented in 1968 the founding, after being turned down once by the university, of a separate Faculty of Business within the University of Istanbul (Aysan & Kurtulus 7 , 1973) . The commercial schools (having increased to four in number and labeled as "academies" in 1959, extending their program from 3 to 4 years) had remained isolated from the American encounter until the mid-1960s when they were able to obtain Agency for International Development (AID) funding and a contract with Michigan State University for faculty exchange (Üsdiken, 2003) . So by the mid-1970s, American content had made considerable inroads into Turkey, though variably across institutions (Aysan & Kurtulus 7 , 1973) . In terms of programs, METU and the American Robert College, that became a Turkish university-Bogaziçi-in 1971 (Freely, 2000) , also pioneered, respectively in 1972 and 1965, master's degrees in business (Aysan & Kurtulus 7 , 1973) . However, it was clearly their undergraduate programs that had become their flagship and remained to be so (Üsdiken, 2003) . Neither had separate graduate business schools, nor were their master's programs called the MBA. Overall, therefore, the undergraduate program offered by university departmen 7 ts and the reformed commercial schools continued to dominate the field almost entirely.
THE PRESENT-DAY PANORAMA
From the mid-1970s it became clear that the American economy and U.S. companies had lost steam, giving way to the rise of new challengers in the form of Germany and Japan. Both had grown rapidly from the 1950s onward and now became alternative models for management (Kudo, Kipping, & Schröter, 2004) , as did the late-but fast-developing "Tiger" economies in South East Asia (Amsden, 2001) . From the late 1980s onward, though, all of these countries experienced repeated economic crises, whereas the United States saw a resurgence and provided once again models for others to follow. Regarding management education, the prediction by Locke (1996) that the "American mystique" would collapse turned out to be premature.
Quite on the contrary, the MBA experienced a popularity not seen before.
In France, the past couple of decades have seen the increasing prestige that some of the écoles of commerce have come to enjoy, enabling their graduates to make further inroads to top management positions (Barsoux & Lawrence, 1991) . During the process, they have developed a hybrid character where, on one hand, they retain the 5-year program typical of French higher education as their "backbone" (Takagi & de Carlo, 2003) , while running at the same time the functionally specialized "Mastere," as well as MBAs and Executive MBAs, some of which would even be taught in English. Management education in universities, though still offering fewer opportunities for top positions (Barsoux & Lawrence, 1991) , have also become widespread and are carried out in the IAE as well as the departments. The former appear to be French translations of the American graduate business school. They would be offering, however, not only MBA-type generalist degrees but also 1-year specialized and coursework-plus dissertation-type programs, and they might also include higher level undergraduate studies (the maîtrise) (Takagi & de Carlo, 2003) .
A somewhat different form of structuration, emergent by the mid-1970s, appears to be presently in place in Italy. The immediate postwar independent institute tradition for graduate and postexperience education survived and even expanded. Thus, in addition to the earlier examples such as ISTUD, new ones emerged, much more prolific in forms of governance, involving in some cases cooperative arrangements between universities and business. Others replicated the example of Bocconi and its SDA, notably the Rome-based LUISS Guido Carli (transformed into this form in the mid1970s with the backing of Italian big business) with the creation of a Scuola di Management. As Gemelli (1998a) observed, these developments have meant an increase in and a proliferation of graduate degrees in management and executive education programs, though of highly varying quality. At the same time, the expansion in graduate degree courses has essentially been in the direction of pre-experience specialist programs of around or less than a year's duration. The approximation of the archetypal MBA remains confined to Bocconi, LUISS, and rare cases such as Politecnico di Milan. The involvement of the public university system, though having expanded too after the 1970s, has been largely limited, apart from the consortia-type arrangements noted above, to the provision of undergraduate education. Moreover, this has been within the faculties of economics or economics and commerce and in ways that embody the sediments of the pre-World War II traditions in content and methodologies of instruction.
In Spain, the small club of schools including IESE, ESADE, and the newer addition, IE, have consolidated their position nationally as the first tier in graduate and postexperience education. ESADE, together with ICADE, continues to maintain a strong presence in undergraduate studies, too, though the latter has been struggling lately to preserve its reputation in view of the competition from the public university system at the undergraduate and IESE and IE at the graduate level (Puig, 2003) . The university sector has increased its presence in undergraduate business education by an expansion after the mid-1980s of the faculties of economics and business administration across the country. Since the 1990s most of these universities have also begun offering MBA programs. They still remain, however, overshadowed by the prestige and leadership of the small club of elite schools. A few of them, such as the young and eliteminded Carlos III in Madrid and Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona are struggling to compete with these schools in the field of graduate education.
Akin in a way to the university sectors in Italy and Spain, the provision of management education in Turkey has expanded in the past 10 or 15 years throughout the country primarily in the form of undergraduate departments within faculties of economics and administrative sciences (Üsdiken, 2003) . This followed the eradication of the dual structure as all commercial schools (academies) were converted into universities with the overhaul in the legal framework in early 1980s. Graduate programs have also flourished after these legislative changes, a large majority of the public universities now offering some form of a master's degree in business, though often in the form of, like the DEA in France (Takagi & de Carlo, 2003) , a year's coursework plus dissertation. The MBA title is also around now. However, only a handful of these (all taught in English) are the 2-year, full-time, generalist, and no-dissertation format approximating the American "ideal-typical" version, though in none prior work experience seems to be a requirement. Of these, two are run by the public universities with strong American imprinting (METU and Bogaziçi), while the other three are offered by universities owned by private foundations, a new species in the Turkish higher education scene, pioneers possibly of a forthcoming new form of duality.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This overview broadly confirms the initial argument of the article, in that American influence has led to varied outcomes with regard to the predominant forms and the institutional structuring of management education across the four countries. Moreover, it has shown that in France and Italy, which had more developed, though different, pre-existing institutional frameworks, American influence produced relatively fewer changes compared to Spain and Turkey. What did flow more easily in all four cases was content, though not necessarily method (i.e., the case study). However, even there, it seems that content and, possibly to some degree, method penetrated postgraduate education more readily. Undergraduate programs, though clearly heterogeneous intranationally, retain a more hybrid character that contains pressures from the broader educational context and traces of the past.
In France, first the écoles de commerce and then the universities, both peripheral to the education for management dominated by the engineering schools, saw Americanization as an opportunity to extend their influence. However, they ascended only very gradually. Some of the commercial schools now are at par with the engineering ones. Universities still have a long way to go, even if they are mounting a serious challenge recently, based on their research credentials and with a growing involvement in graduate degrees, such as Mastere. The only U.S.-type institution, INSEAD, still remains an outsider. Americanization did take place, however, at the more micro level, especially since the late 1960s and 1970s, penetrating through curricular changes into content and in the way of new programs.
In Italy, the early wave of the American encounter produced limited effects in terms of new institutions, though it did serve to generate, albeit peripheral at the time, a new cluster of private institutes with a postgraduate and postexperience orientation. The subsequent 20 or more years of American contact fraught with struggles between the old and the new culminated in some degree of reform of the old, as the faculties of economics in universities, together with engineering, introduced first-degree programs in business spurring, in turn, changes in the postwar institutes and later the creation and proliferation of some newer ones. Notable in the Italian case, was also the latecoming reform, akin to the French écoles in that sense, in one other old but peripheral private institution, the Bocconi, unique in that setting but highly significant in its later outcomes.
By contrast, institutional changes were much more profound in Spain and Turkey, even if their focus (and outcome) was significantly different. Here management as an idea and a social group had not really taken hold before the Second World War because of belated economic development. Institutions for businessorientated education in particular were in the making and structurally feeble. American models therefore could penetrate easier than in France and Italy, where a number of large-scale enterprises had emerged since the late 19th century, drawing on the existing educational institutions for the training of its managerial personnel-or creating new ones, that is, the écoles de commerce in the French case. Spain and Turkey therefore imported more extensively from the United States, while the latter also exported its model more aggressively and openly-possibly because of the geo-strategic importance of these countries. In France and Italy, they treaded more carefully, also because of strong communist parties and their affiliated trade unions, which were not only anti-American but also to a certain extent antimanagerialist.
In Spain and Turkey, the new institutions were not only there to stay but also became increasingly central in management education and elite reproduction. It was in Spain, in particular, that the private Catholic institutes that had started out at the periphery, imitating the American model and remaining outside universities, increasingly moved to the core of management education, though some had to succumb to a relative emphasis on pre-experience undergraduate education. In Turkey, neither could independent schools nor postgraduate programs flourish, the increasing significance of management education relying almost entirely on the undergraduate degree. Even in Turkey, however, the impetus for the first degree came from the two American-type undergraduate institutions, which then moved toward becoming the prime providers of management education and opened the way for the more traditional universities and the commercial schools, the project of academicization (and gaining university status) of the latter also aided to some degree by Americanization. Despite these differences that had evolved after World War II, in one sense all the four countries were similar. This concerns the long gestation of universitybased management education. Moreover, in none of the countries did the archetypal American model of the "graduate business school within the university" emerge. In France, the formation of the IAE, and its counterpart in Turkey, the IIE, which offered new business degrees (initially 1-year certificates) in the universities, constituted an early step out of their shadows, however, it did not lead to the formation of professional business schools. Neither is the INSEAD in France a university-affiliated institution. IESE, linked to the Universidad de Navarra and the SDA in Bocconi possibly come closest.
Also notable in this respect is that the more recent internationalization of management education within these countries has involved institutions outside the university system. IESE from Spain and clearly INSEAD but also some of the now grandes écoles de commerce in France and Bocconi in Italy, constitute the prime examples. All of them were nationally peripheral at one stage, either formed with the early wave of American influence or transformed somewhat later in their curricular structures and content in responding to the American challenge. Notably, they are private institutions independent of the university sector in their countries and are therefore unalike their American counterparts. As hybrids shaped in their specific national contexts they have turned out to be more adept to the international ecology of management education.
